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Comment

Urgent need for integrated pandemic policies on pathogen
spillover
In response to COVID-19, international organisations
(eg, WHO and G20) have convened multiple expert
panels tasked with objectives such as assessing what
happened during COVID-19, why it happened, and
how it can be prevented from happening again.1,2
Unfortunately, these panels have failed to develop
comprehensive strategies that address the source
of most emerging infectious diseases: spillover of
pathogens from animals to people.
Instead, expert panels have focused on preparing for
and responding to pathogens after they have emerged
in human populations. Although these policies are
crucial, they only address part of the solution. Pandemic
preparedness and response alone are insufficient,
partly because it is difficult to predict infectious disease
dynamics before spillover. The urban transmission
of Ebola virus, sexual transmission of Zika virus, and
airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 all highlight that
emerging infectious diseases can have characteristics
that defy conventional clinical and epidemiological
expectations. Similarly, it is possible that a future
novel pathogen will have attributes (eg, a long presymptomatic transmission period) that render even
the best public health response efforts ineffective.
Furthermore, we cannot assume that pharmaceutical
countermeasures, even if available, will have enough
uptake to halt spread, given the institutional mistrust,
vaccine wariness, and misinformation that have become
more prominent in society.
COVID-19 is at least the seventh pandemic to occur
over the past century.3–6 To minimise the risk of future
pandemics, pathogen spillover must be prevented
along with pandemic preparedness and response. The
risk for pathogen spillover is on the rise because of
increased human and domestic animal interactions with
wildlife related to deforestation, animal husbandry, and
wildlife trade.7 The global health sector is crucial to the
implementation of solutions to prevent spillover that
complement existing efforts to prepare for an outbreak.
Among these solutions are policies aimed at
stopping deforestation, improving community health
in emerging infectious disease hotspots, improving
livestock management and surveillance, and banning
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or strictly regulating wildlife trade that poses a public
health risk. Deforestation brings susceptible people into
forest environments, where they come into contact with
wildlife and disease vectors (eg, mosquitoes) during
logging, hunting, and other activities.8 The international
community must support relevant countries in stopping
deforestation through innovative solutions such as
policy-based and market-based incentives for keeping
primary forests intact.9 In regions where forests have
been heavily cleared or degraded and spillover risk is
already high (eg, in West Africa and southeast Asia),
community health must be strengthened. Additionally,
wildlife and livestock pathogen surveillance should be
scaled-up to manage and quickly contain outbreaks
within animal populations before spillover to humans
occurs. Finally, the health sector is uniquely positioned
to engage in policy formulation to ban or strictly
regulate wildlife trade that poses a public health risk
but does not compromise the food security of local
communities.
Unfortunately, this type of forward thinking,
multisectoral prevention has been almost entirely
overlooked by the expert panels. For instance, in May,
2021, the WHO-commissioned Independent Panel for
Pandemic Preparedness and Response (IPPPR) released
a report titled, COVID-19: Make it the Last Pandemic.1
The IPPPR provided thorough recommendations on
preparedness and response and acknowledged that most
emerging pathogens are zoonotic in origin; however,
it failed to provide concrete strategies for spillover
prevention. This omission could have been expected,
given that the IPPPR’s objective was to “[prepare] the
world…so that the next disease outbreak does not
become a pandemic.”1 The scope of this objective does
little to address the mechanisms for how pathogens
emerge in human populations.7 Failure to acknowledge
solutions that target pathogen spillover also reveals
a disquieting global health injustice. It signals that
the international community is tolerant of continued
zoonotic outbreaks in low-income and low-resource
settings so long as they do not become pandemics.
In July, 2021, the G20 High Level Independent Panel
(HLIP) released a report proposing the organisation
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of global finances to address future pandemics.2 The
HLIP’s report discussed habitat loss and livestock
management as components of prevention requiring
greater attention. However, the HLIP excluded a
complete One Health approach in their investment
calculations because “it would have been difficult to
provide comprehensive and up-to-date estimates.”2 The
intentionality of omitting these costs is underscored by
the fact that they had been shared by experts engaging
with the HLIP but were still excluded.10 By keeping One
Health costs ill-defined and deeming this investment as
out of scope, the HLIP abandoned a core public health
principle: engaging in primary prevention by addressing
upstream drivers of pandemics. The unfortunate reality
is that spillover prevention costs of approximately
US$10 billion pale in comparison with the millions of
lives and trillions of dollars that it has cost to respond to
COVID-19.10
The IPPPR called for a transformation of global
systems on 18 occasions in their 86-page report.1 True
transformational change requires looking beyond
traditional disciplines that constrain our ability to solve
intersecting systems issues. Preparedness and response
are undoubtedly important to planning for future
pandemics. However, they are only part of the solution;
governments must also commit to incorporating
prevention of pathogen spillover to ensure equitable,
integrated pandemic policies.
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